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1 – Abstract 
 Michael Tomasello's account of language development, and hence of human 
linguistic uniqueness, differs strongly from the Chomksyan version that is currently 
dominant in the field of linguistics. Tomasello claims that human language is not due to a 
genetic endowment unique to the species Homo sapiens, but rather, that humans have 
certain non-language-specific cognitive and interpersonal capacities that lead them to 
become full participants in the social use of language. In his current theory, individuals of 
any species would require the general capacities of intention-reading, relevance 
assumptions, role reversal imitation, and pattern-finding in order to develop a language. 
Because these capacities are not conceived of as specifically and autonomously linguistic 
– but rather as social and cognitive in nature – their presence or absence in prelinguistic 
human infants and nonhuman apes can be tested for using the experimental methods of 
developmental psychology and cognitive science. Based on such tests, Tomasello has 
concluded that whereas human children possess all of the capacities that he deems 
necessary for language acquisition, there is limited or negative evidence for chimpanzees' 
capacities to act helpfully, assume helpfulness in others, form joint goals, and construct 
and conform to group expectations. This thesis raises a degree of skepticism towards 
Tomasello's claims, citing the growing body of evidence against his specific research 
findings involving both apes and humans. It further suggests that his overall account of 
the necessary capacities for language development is both unverified and unverifiable, 
and that therefore the issue of human linguistic uniqueness is still an open question. 
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2 – Introduction 
 Over the long history of humankind's metalinguistic commentary, that is, our use 
of language to discuss matters of language, it has frequently been observed that language 
itself is a uniquely human phenomenon. In the modern field of linguistics today, scholars 
argue over what the precise definition of language should be, but essentially all of them 
would agree that it is a code, or practice, or cultural artifact, or mental faculty found only 
among members of the human species. However adept members of other species are in 
communicating with one another in the wild, and however impressive certain 
experimental efforts to foster language skills in nonhuman lab subjects may appear, to the 
best knowledge of modern science, there has never been a user of language who was not 
also a member of the species Homo sapiens. 
 From the perspective of modern science, moreover, there must be some 
explanatory factor to account for the presence of linguistic behaviors in humans and their 
absence in individuals of other species. As human infants develop skills in language as 
they age, while members of even closely related species do not, there must be some 
factor or factors unique to humans that enable language development. Noam Chomsky, 
the seminal figure of modern linguistics, has asserted that this factor is the language 
faculty itself, which he views as a single genetic endowment for linguistic competence, 
an adaptation unique to our species and autonomous from other human abilities. In 
essence, Chomsky argues that humans evolved language in a single genetic adaptation 
sometime after our evolutionary split from the other ape species, and so the non-linguistic 
skills humans share with other primates are irrelevant to an explanation of human 
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language (Chomsky 1996). In the Chomskyan view, only humans have language because 
only humans have evolved the specific genetic adaptation for language. 
 Other scientists disagree with this position, however, and emphasize the cognitive 
and social complexities that have been documented in closely related animals such as 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Various research findings that chimp communication is 
atypically complex in the animal kingdom suggest to these researchers that perhaps 
Chomsky is mistaken in separating human language so discretely from other cognitive 
capacities in our species. They contend that perhaps human language is not the product of 
a single autonomous genetic endowment, but is instead something that can be learned by 
any creature with the proper complex of skills in cognition and sociality. From this 
perspective, the communicational abilities of chimpanzees may represent evidence that 
some of the requisite skills for acquiring language can be found in the capacities of other 
species. 
 Researcher Michael Tomasello is one such thinker who discounts the Chomskyan 
definition of the nature of language in favor of a more nuanced account of the interacting 
cognitive and social skills underlying linguistic competence. Tomasello's theory of 
language development in human infants highlights specific capacities that he argues lead 
to children becoming full participants in the social use of language. Because these 
capacities are not conceived of as specifically and autonomously linguistic – but rather as 
social and cognitive in nature – their presence or absence in prelinguistic human infants 
and nonhuman apes can be tested for using the experimental methods of developmental 
psychology and cognitive science.  
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 Tomasello's account is not in disagreement with the claim that nonhuman apes 
lack the capacity to acquire language in a human-like fashion. He admits that despite 
humanity's close evolutionary tie to chimpanzees and the other great apes, the capacity of 
our infants to acquire language is unmatched in the young of those other species. 
However, unlike Chomsky, Tomasello argues that many of the abilities which foster 
language development in human infants can be experimentally proven to exist in other 
species as well. In Tomasello's theoretical framework, the ultimate explanation for human 
linguistic uniqueness will be found in the identification of those abilities which are 
necessary for the development of language, and which are present in humans but not in 
chimpanzees. 
 In this thesis, I attempt to provide an overview of Tomasello's research and 
conclusions on the topic of language acquisition and its corollary, human linguistic 
uniqueness. I begin by describing Tomasello's general approach to the topic of language 
and his claim that language is – and should be studied as – a facet of cognition. I describe 
the strengths of this approach, and how it has affected Tomasello's explanation for human 
linguistic uniqueness. I also note that as new research findings have revealed behavioral 
capacities hitherto unrecognized in nonhumans, Tomasello has had to modify his views 
on why only humans can acquire a language. 
 The thesis then provides a detailed look at the researcher's current account of the 
cognitive capacities required for the acquisition of language, explaining Tomasello's view 
that intention-reading, role reversal imitation, relevance assumptions, and pattern-finding 
skills undergird the individual's development of language. For each of these behavioral 
capacities, I also provide a description of the experimental evidence Tomasello cites in 
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support of the claim of its presence in humans and its presence or absence in apes. The 
thesis ends with a discussion of Tomasello's research and his arguments, and of how 
elements of the former may support but do not prove the latter. I suggest that although 
Tomasello has crafted a cohesive and compelling account of human linguistic 
uniqueness, he has in no way solved the puzzle.  
3 – Tomasello's Approach to Language 
3.1 – Overview
 In Tomasello's current theory of language acquisition, language is treated not as a 
specific biological adaptation, but rather as a form of cognition that children develop 
through regular interaction with adult speakers. In this view, human children are born 
with certain cognitive capacities that foster growth in linguistic competence and with 
certain interpersonal abilities that motivate such development. Tomasello agrees with 
Chomsky that members of no other known species, including the closely related 
chimpanzees, are able to develop language, but he argues that this fact does not indicate 
that language is an inherently human endowment. Rather, in Tomasello's view, creatures 
such as chimpanzees lack some of the cognitive and interpersonal capacities that are 
prerequisites to language and which human children possess. According to Tomasello's 
account of language learning, there is a necessary relationship between a being's 
possession of those particular capacities – rather than of a specific language endowment 
in humans – and his or her development of language. Specifically, he contends that 
language is learned by an individual who hears an utterance, attempts to decipher the 
meaning intended by its speaker, and then, in order to communicate the same meaning, 
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intentionally produces the same form(s). An individual of any species which possesses 
the requisite cognitive and interpersonal capacities should – according to Tomasello – be 
able to develop language in this way. As a corollary to this necessary relationship which 
he posits, Tomasello asserts that beings that cannot develop language must be deficit in 
one or more of the capacities necessary for such a process. 
 Tomasello's theoretical and experimental approach to language has been heavily 
influenced by the early work of the psychologist Jerome Bruner, who emerged in the 
1970s with a view of language development in many ways contrary to the dominant 
Chomskyan framework of the time. Bruner held that children acquire language in the 
context of familiar, regularized environments that scaffold the learning experience, and 
that a child in such an environment is an active participant motivated to master linguistic 
forms for communicative purposes. Bruner also asserted that neither language nor its 
acquisition is wholly autonomous from other cognitive complexities of the human mind, 
as Chomsky had argued, but rather that each is best understood as a process of human 
cognition in general (Bruner 1985). Bruner's framework thus allowed him to empirically 
study the developmental stages of child language acquisition, with a focus on linking 
increasing linguistic proficiency with the cognitive capabilities displayed by human 
children before and during the acquisition process.
 Bruner later modified his original set of claims by conceding to Chomsky's 
position that language learning relies upon a Language Acquisition Device (LAD) 
biologically encoded in humans, while stressing that such a device could not operate 
without an environmental Language Acquisition Support System (LASS) of familiar 
frames for the child to learn within (Joseph, Love, and Taylor 2001). Tomasello disagrees 
MICHAEL TOMASELLO ON LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT 9 
with this later concession, but he supports Bruner's original position that language is a 
form of human cognition rather than a distinct and autonomous biological endowment. 
3.2 – Language as cognition
 In Tomasello's words, language is "cognition packaged for purposes of 
interpersonal communication" (Tomasello 2008: 150), and he considers there to be no 
theoretical need for a separate Language Acquisition Device. Instead, he argues that the 
skills humans employ to acquire and use language are tied to species-characteristic 
general cognitive and interpersonal abilities. Tomasello considers this socio-cognitivist 
position to be "a less rigidly nativistic view of language acquisition in which there is a 
biological foundation for language, just not in the form of specific linguistic structures 
preformed in the human genome" (Tomasello 1995: 32). It is in this sense that he likens 
language to the game of chess, whose rules are learned as new players interact "with 
mature players… [to] develop quite sophisticated cognitive skills in the context of this 
game, many of which would seem domain specific in the extreme" (Tomasello 1999: 
207). Such complexities, Tomasello argues, do not indicate that we as a species have 
evolved some sort of "innate chess-playing module" (Ibid.), but merely that humans have 
the cognitive powers to develop abilities in chess when exposed to the right sort of 
learning environment. Tomasello considers language to be, like chess, the result "of both 
historical and ontogenetic developments working with a variety of pre-existing human 
cognitive skills, some of which are shared with other primates and some of which are 
uniquely human" (208).  
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3.3 – Strengths of Tomasello's approach 
 Because of this socio-cognitive perspective, Tomasello has chosen to examine the 
development of children's language through the experimental study of their cognitive and 
interpersonal capabilities. Tomasello's focus on abilities that are not autonomously 
linguistic has meant that he can construct tests without regard to any specific theory as to 
the nature of linguistic knowledge. Instead, following the early Bruner, Tomasello studies 
cognitive and interpersonal abilities apart from language, and uses his experimental 
findings to inform his theory of language development.  Another strength of Tomasello's 
research paradigm is that, because the cognitive and interpersonal skills he examines can 
be experimentally researched independently of language-using abilities, such capacities 
can be tested for in nonhuman apes as well as in humans. By conducting such tests and 
making cross-species comparisons based on his research findings on cognition and 
sociality, Tomasello formulates his conclusions regarding the species-specific nature of 
human language. 
3.4 – Human linguistic uniqueness 
 With this focus on studying language as a facet of cognition not dependent upon 
any specialized genetic linguistic adaptation, Tomasello asserts that human linguistic 
distinctiveness cannot be explained by merely labeling language as a human-only 
domain. That is, he reasons that if there were some single "language gene" which enabled 
language and which was present only in the human lineage, as Chomsky contends, then 
the fact of human linguistic uniqueness could be explained in fairly simple terms: humans 
alone have language because humans alone have the genetic adaptation for language, and 
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other animals do not have language because other animals do not have the language gene. 
The self-supporting nature of such a claim effectively rules out cross-species research on 
the subject, however, and it does not take into consideration Bruner's finding that non-
linguistic cognitive skills scaffold the acquisition of language in humans. Rather than 
positing human uniqueness as founded in a genetic endowment for language, Tomasello's 
approach has been to determine precisely which general social and cognitive – which is 
to say, non-linguistic – capacities humans make use of in their acquisition  of language, 
and then to experimentally test for each of these capabilities in our closest relatives, 
chimpanzees and the other great apes1. Due to the relatively recent evolutionary 
branching of our species from the other apes, Tomasello reasons that the cognitive skill 
set of humanity should closely resemble that of the chimpanzees, and that the cognitive 
and interpersonal abilities of modern nonhuman apes represent "evolutionary steps along 
the way to human communicative activities" (Tomasello 2008: 19–20). Because he 
believes that linguistic competence is a form of cognition enabled by certain interpersonal 
capacities rather than a specific human adaptation for language, Tomasello engages in 
cross-species comparisons of such capacities with the goal of isolating the specific 
domains in which the human skill-set differs from that of other apes. According to his 
framework, it is these differences that must explain why species whose cognitive and 
interpersonal capacities otherwise greatly resemble those of humans have not also 
developed language. 
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 3.5 – Tomasello's shifting conclusions on linguistic uniqueness 
 Tomasello thus asserts that the explanation for human linguistic uniqueness will 
be found in the cognitive and interpersonal feature(s) that humans possess and that 
chimpanzees do not. Because, over time, scientists have discovered more about the 
abilities possessed by great apes, Tomasello's conclusions regarding the specific 
capacities that drive human language competence have undergone a number of shifts. For 
example, in 1999 Tomasello's writings detailed "the uniquely human social-cognitive 
adaptation for identifying with other persons and so understanding them as intentional 
agents like the self" (Tomasello 1999: 7), a single factor that, he argued, results in "most, 
if not all, of the species-unique cognitive skills of human beings (Ibid. 15)." More 
recently, however, Tomasello has observed "that great apes understand much about how 
others work as intentional, perceiving agents… in ways very similar to young human 
children" (Tomasello 2008: 45). Such findings have required Tomasello to periodically 
revisit his conclusions on the specific factor(s) underlying human linguistic uniqueness. 
 This thesis is concerned primarily with Tomasello's current model of language 
development and explanation for human linguistic uniqueness, but it is important to 
realize that historically his claims have resembled shifting goalposts for human socio-
cognitive exclusivity. One significant critique of his approach is therefore that at any 
point in his career, his theory of linguistic uniqueness has included the claim that 
chimpanzees do not possess some capacity or set of capacities X, and yet each prior 
iteration of this claim has eventually had to be discarded in light of more refined 
experimental techniques and subsequent experimental findings. There is therefore no 
clear and compelling reason to assume that the experiments Tomasello cites in support of 
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his most recent account cannot and will not be refined further, to perhaps yield strikingly 
different findings regarding chimpanzee capacities in the future. Even within the 
structures of Tomasello's experimental approach, there is growing evidence that it may be 
time for him to shift the goalposts of human linguistic uniqueness once more, and that the 
features that have succeeded intention-reading as language-necessary and human-unique 
in his current account may in fact be present in chimpanzees as well. I take up this 
discussion again in the final section of this thesis. 
4 - Tomasello's account of the cognitive capacities necessary for language 
4.1 - Intention-reading 
While Tomasello no longer believes that the understanding of intentionality in 
others is a trait unique to humans, he still maintains that it is one of the fundamental and 
necessary capacities of an organism that enable it to acquire language. In Tomasello's 
theory of language acquisition, an organism's capacity "to understand conspecifics as 
intentional/mental agents like the self" (Tomasello 1999: 53) allows the individual to 
enter into periods of joint attention with others, in which the acquisition of new signs can 
take place. Necessary prerequisites to the development of this understanding are therefore 
the individual's understanding that he or she is an intentional being, as well as his or her 
ability to draw analogies between others and the self. In Tomasello's words, developing 
individuals first "come to a new understanding of their own intentional actions… then use 
their 'like me' stance to understand the behavior of other persons in this same way" 
(Tomasello 1999: 72). According to Tomasello, this recognition of intentionality in the 
actions of others, a skill he refers to as 'intention-reading,' is the understanding that others 
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"have goals and… make active choices among behavioral means for attaining those 
goals, including active choices about what to pay attention to in pursuit of them" 
(Tomasello 2003: 21). Thus, for Tomasello, abilities of intention-reading are those of 
attention-reading as well. 
 An individual with such abilities, argues Tomasello, is one who is able to enter 
into the joint attentional frames that Bruner theorized were central to the language 
acquisition process. While two individuals (prototypically an adult and a child) could 
happen to be each attending to the same object or situation, for Tomasello the two cannot 
be said to be engaging in joint attention unless each understands that his or her own 
attention and the other's are intentionally directed. Even if the adult, understanding the 
intentionality of both parties, has somehow acted to direct the child's attention to where 
the adult is attending, if the child does not understand that the adult has done so 
intentionally, a joint attentional frame will not arise. Tomasello elaborates: 
The basic point is that joint attentional frames are defined intentionally, 
that is, they gain their identity and coherence from the child's and the 
adult's understandings of "what we are doing" in terms of the goal-directed 
activities in which we are engaged… Consequently, when an adult 
addresses an utterance to an infant too young to comprehend intentions, 
from the infant's point of view the adult is just making noise… Sounds 
become language for young children when and only when they understand 
that the adult is making that sound with the intention that they attend to 
something. This requires an understanding of other persons as intentional 
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agents who intend things toward one's own intentional states. (Tomasello 
2003: 22-23) 
Thus, according to Tomasello, only an individual capable of intention-reading – that is, 
capable of recognizing intentionality in others – will be able to enter into periods of joint 
attention with other individuals, and thereby come to acquire language. 
 As noted above, it was once Tomasello's claim that humans alone are capable of 
recognizing intentionality in others. Following his theory, ascribing to humans an 
intention-reading capability implies that a) humans can analogize from themselves to 
others, b) humans can recognize their own intentions, and c) humans can understand the 
intentionality of others. The first of these points, claims Tomasello, is supported by a 
survey of research on human neonatal imitation conducted by Meltzoff and Gopnik 
(1993), who propose that humans "understand that other persons are 'like me' from birth – 
with much learning of specifics still to come" (Tomasello 1999: 71). Next, Tomasello 
observes that experimental evidence supports the claim that human infants can recognize 
their own intentionality, although this ability appears to develop around the eight- to 
nine-month mark in most human children. For example, Piaget (1952, 1954) found that 
children younger than eight months, when reaching for a desired toy, would react to an 
adult placing a pillow in front of the toy either by switching to interact with the pillow 
instead of the toy or by remaining focused on the toy while expressing frustration at the 
new object. At the eight-month mark, however, a human infant in this experimental 
situation would typically react by grasping the pillow, moving it aside, and then 
proceeding to interact with the toy. In Tomasello's analysis, "the infant removes an 
obstacle and proceeds without hesitation to the goal, [so] it is plausible to assume she had 
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a distinct goal in mind ahead of time… and clearly differentiated this goal from the 
various behavioral means among which she had to choose in order to attain the goal" 
(Tomasello 1999: 73). That is, this infant subject in Piaget's experiments evidently 
understood that she had an intention to play with the toy in question, and consciously 
chose a series of actions to carry out to bring that goal to fruition. Such a being, asserts 
Tomasello, understands herself as an intentional agent. 
 Regarding the final component of an intention-reading capability, Tomasello 
argues that human infants are also capable of bringing together their analogizing skills 
and their understanding of their own intentionality to recognize that others are intentional 
beings as well. "By at least 12 months of age," he writes, "[human] infants understand 
that actors actively choose means for pursuing goals… that others see things… [and] that 
actors choose to attend intentionally, for some reason, to some subset of the things they 
perceive" (Tomasello 2008: 139). As evidence for these capacities, he cites a 2003 study 
by Tomasello and Haberl, in which 12-month-old human infants showed evidence of 
being able to reason that an adult's excitement was over an object in the room that was 
new to the adult, even though the same object was not new to the child. In the 
researchers' analysis, the infants appeared to understand that another individual's 
experience can affect his or her emotional reaction and attention, and that in such cases 
the other is intentionally directing his or her attention toward what is egocentrically new 
and exciting. Based on these findings, Tomasello concludes that there is experimental 
support that human infants possess each of the component abilities that he claims are 
necessary for intention-reading and engaging in joint attention.  
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 To determine whether apes might also be able to engage in such intention-reading 
and joint-attentional behaviors, Tomasello has tested for the presence or absence in the 
chimpanzee species of the abilities a, b, and c above. The first of these, the ability of an 
ape to analogize from itself to others, has to my knowledge never been specifically 
addressed by Michael Tomasello in an experimental setting. Nevertheless, in a 2007 
study examining altruistic motives in chimpanzees, Tomasello's research team found that 
ape subjects who watched a conspecific struggle to open a door that the apes observing 
knew how to open would spontaneously apply that knowledge to open the door for the 
other ape (Warneken et al. 2007). In this experiment, the subjects did not appear to expect 
a reward for their behavior, and they did not engage in the behavior in a control condition 
when a group-mate was not attempting to access the door (Tomasello 2009: 11). While 
there are many possible implications of such findings, Tomasello has argued that an 
individual solving a problem for another by applying a solution previously learned in an 
egocentric context must be engaging in some sort of self-to-other analogy. 
 The second component of an intention-reading capacity is the ability of an 
individual to recognize his or her own intentions. In his most recent published works, 
Tomasello has argued that this too is an ability possessed by apes. Many primate 
gestures, he says, "are individually learned and flexibly used, especially in the great apes, 
and so may be properly called intentional signals" (Tomasello 2008: 20). Among the 
reasons he provides for such an assertion – which contrasts with his 1999 published 
opinion – is the finding that ape "individuals typically produce a gesture only when the 
recipient is appropriately attentive, and afterward they often monitor the recipient's 
reaction and wait for a response… sometimes [using] sequences or combinations of 
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multiple gestures when the other does not react appropriately" (Ibid. 21). Tomasello 
argues that in this way apes resemble the infants in Piaget's pillow-and-toy studies, as 
they appear to form a goal and intentionally pursue that goal by making conscious 
choices of various means along the way. Tomasello thus concludes that nonhuman apes 
possess the second component of intention-reading from his theory, the understanding of 
their own nature as intentional beings. 
 Finally, Tomasello argues that apes appear to understand the intentionality of 
others. He notes that when apes gesture to a conspecific, they monitor the other's 
perception and gesture more frequently when that individual is facing them. Tomasello 
describes this monitoring as "a paradigm case of intentional action, in this case toward 
others and with some understanding of the way the other's reaction depends on her 
abilities to perceive and intend things" (Tomasello 2008: 33). That is, Tomasello thinks 
there is conclusive evidence that an ape can understand that others have their own 
perceptions and intentions and can reason that these will determine what the response to 
his or her actions toward them will be. The evidence Tomasello cites to support an ape 
understanding of others' goals includes the research finding that when a human researcher 
repeatedly passes food items to a chimpanzee and then stops, "the ape reacts in a 
frustrated manner if the human is doing this for no good reason (i.e., is unwilling) 
whereas she waits patiently if the human is making good-faith attempts to give the object 
but failing or having accidents (i.e., is unable)" (Tomasello 2008: 45). In addition, in 
research such as the altruism study mentioned above, chimpanzees offer help to 
conspecifics "in a way very similar to human infants – which requires an understanding 
of the other's goal" (Ibid.). Studies of apes also indicate their awareness of others' 
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perceptions, as when test subjects take into account whether a human researcher can see 
them when gesturing to ask for food (Tomasello 2008: 47). Tomasello concludes from 
these findings that apes, like humans, are aware of other beings' intentionality. Thus, in 
accordance with his current theory of language acquisition, he should conclude that apes 
have the cognitive skill-set required to engage in joint attentional frames as well. While 
to my knowledge Tomasello himself has never explicitly drawn this conclusion in print, 
he did find in a comparative study of chimpanzees and human infants that in interaction 
with an adult human and some object, individuals of each species interacted with the 
object while simultaneously monitoring the adult human's behavior and eye gaze 
relatively frequently. In that study, Tomasello notes that there was some discrepancy 
between the behavior of enculturated and captive apes in this regard, but that in the right 
environment, chimpanzees can display "human-like social-cognitive and joint attentional 
skills" (Carpenter, Tomasello, and Savage-Rumbaugh 1995).  
4.2 - Relevance assumptions 
 According to Tomasello, scenes of joint attention scaffold the language 
acquisition process, providing a narrowed context for a language learner attempting to 
understand new linguistic forms. He defines the communicative context as "not simply 
everything in the immediate environment, from the temperature of the room to the sounds 
of birds in the background, but rather… what is 'relevant' to the social interaction, that is, 
what each participant sees as relevant and knows that the other sees as relevant as well" 
(Tomasello 2008: 74). As such, the ability to make assumptions of relevance within the 
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domain of joint attentional scenes is fundamental to Tomasello's account of a language 
learner's requisite capabilities. In his words: 
The key for language understanding in such a situation would be for the 
[adult] speaker to use some novel word or phrase in a context that 
suggested his reason for making that utterance at that time… In such 
cases, the learner makes an inference of the type: If the speaker is using 
that unknown expression with communicative intention X, then it is 
relevant to his goal in the current join attentional frame as I already know 
it. (Tomasello 2003: 25) 
To illustrate this claim by means of a constructed example, we could imagine a one-year-
old child watching his father pick up toys from around the room. If at one point the father 
were to point to a toy fire truck sitting next to the child and say, "How about that truck 
there?", Tomasello would argue that if any language-learning is to occur, the child must 
be able to infer that the adult is intending for that stream of sounds to be relevant to his 
goal of cleaning up the toys. Without making that inference of relevance, Tomasello says, 
the child will not be able to determine the speaker's meaning. Thus, in Tomasello's 
theory, a language learner must approach scenes of joint attention with the assumption 
that the speaker has some particular "communicative intention" motivating his speech 
act(s) therein. As the above passage indicates, however, Tomasello also believes that 
competent language users actually have such intentions, their "reason for making that 
[relevant] utterance at that time." (In our constructed example, this would be the father's 
intention that the toys be picked up from the floor.) Tomasello asserts that for a speech 
act to be understood by a new language learner, it "must be grounded [by the speaker] in 
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the immediate joint attentional frame in a manner sensitive to the current perspective, 
knowledge, and expectations of the listener" (Tomasello 2003: 293)2. At a general level, 
then, Tomasello's account of language includes speakers (and would-be speakers) acting 
with relevance toward the current scene and assuming such relevance in the acts of 
others.  
 Relevance alone does not account for comprehension of communicative acts, 
however. Rather, in Tomasello's theory, human-like skills of language develop from 
motivations of helpfulness, which lead individuals to act with relevance specifically to 
the other party in an interaction. It is necessary but not sufficient, he argues, for language 
users to generally act relevantly and assume relevance in others; in addition, they must 
act helpfully and assume such helpfulness in others. When one being capable of language 
communicates with another, Tomasello says, "the assumption that I am attempting to 
inform you of something I think you will find useful or interesting guides your search for 
communicative relevance" (Tomasello 2008: 101). By his reasoning, learners of a 
language must assume that what is said to them in a joint attentional scene is intended to 
be "useful or interesting" to themselves, and for this reason be highly motivated to 
decipher acts of communication directed toward them. In his own words, this assumption 
of the other's helpfulness on the part of each party in a linguistic interaction "is what 
motivates them to cooperate in getting the message across in the first place – they both 
assume mutually that it will be to their individual and mutual benefit to do so" 
(Tomasello 2008: 88). Assumptions and motivations of mutual helpfulness enable the 
two parties to work together to ensure that the language learner fully understands the 
communicative act in question: "the participants in [language-like] communication must 
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reason not just practically, but cooperatively" (Tomasello 2008: 93). Only through this 
sort of cooperation, Tomasello argues, can language learning occur. 
 To illustrate his reasoning, Tomasello presents an example based on Quine (1960) 
of a visitor to an unfamiliar culture who does not speak the local language. If a native of 
that culture were to utter the word "Gavagai" as a rabbit ran past, argues Quine, the 
visitor would have no means of telling which aspect of the situation the speaker was 
intending to highlight: the rabbit itself, its coloring, its speed, its unexpectedness, its 
suitability as the night's dinner, or any of practically an infinite number of other 
possibilities. Tomasello agrees that "without any forms of shared experience or common 
ground with the native speaker (which are, for the purposes of the parable, specifically 
excluded), there is simply no way" for the visitor to understand what the other has meant 
(Tomasello 2008: 156). However, he comments, a variation on Quine's parable illustrates 
the transformative power of cooperative assumptions upon the learning environment: 
Suppose that there is a cultural practice in the native's village of catching 
small fish for dinner in a certain way [involving a bucket and a pole]… 
And let us assume that the stranger is in the process of becoming 
enculturated into this practice through repeated participation. Now one 
evening when dinnertime comes, and preparations begin, the native picks 
up the pole from outside the hut and points for the stranger through the 
door to inside the hut – perhaps saying "Gavagai." To the degree that the 
stranger understands the practice, she will know that the native wants her 
to fetch the bucket inside so that they can go fishing – and so the word 
gavagai almost certainly means either "bucket" or "fetch," or perhaps 
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something more generic like "that" or "there." But if upon arriving at the 
stream, the native starts indicating to the stranger that she should fetch 
other things, also using the word gavagai, and not using this word to point 
out things when they do not need to be fetched, our stranger can begin to 
crack into the native language. (Tomasello 2008: 156-157) 
If, as in this example, (a) the native speaker intends for his speech to benefit the 
addressee to some degree, and (b) the language learner assumes this to be case, then, 
Tomasello concludes, the learner will be motivated to master the new linguistic form. 
And if the unfamiliar utterance takes place within the domain of a joint attentional frame 
– established in the example above through the two individuals' joint pursuit of a 
common goal – then, Tomasello argues, the learner will be able to use the communicative 
context of the joint attentional frame to determine the speaker's meaning. This, Tomasello 
claims, is how human infants come to understand the language that is addressed to them. 
 Tomasello has collected a substantial body of experimental data supporting the 
claim that human children make pragmatic assumptions of relevance on the part of their 
partners in social interactions. For example, one study familiarized twenty-four month 
old children with four distinct hiding places of four distinct objects, after which an adult 
announced her intention to "find the gazzer" and attempted to open one hiding place in 
particular. Upon finding it locked, the researcher frowned in vexation and said "Let's see 
what else we can find" before proceeding to take out an object from a different hiding 
place and then smiling. In later testing, children demonstrated that they had learned the 
word gazzer for the first object, even though a) they never saw the object directly after 
the adult researcher said the word, b) they did see a distracter object soon after the 
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utterance, and c) the adult smiled at the distracter object and frowned in relation to the 
object that remained locked away (Akhtar and Tomasello 1996). In a similar study, a 
twenty-four month old child, his or her mother, and a researcher played together with 
three distinct objects until the mother left the room, after which the researcher brought 
out a fourth object for the child and him to play with as well. Upon the mother's return to 
the room, she exclaimed "Oh look! A modi, a modi!" without looking at any one 
particular object. Children tested in this manner later demonstrated an association 
between the word modi and the fourth object of the study, leading Tomasello's team to 
conclude that they had reasoned the other three objects would not have been relevant to 
their mothers' excitement (Akhtar, Carpenter, and Tomasello, 1996). Tests such as these, 
Tomasello claims, indicate that as early as age twenty-four months, human infants can 
use social-pragmatic relevance reasoning to understand novel utterances (Tomasello 
1999: 114-115). 
 In the experiments testing for assumptions of relevance, the adult researchers 
were instructed to act with relevance themselves. However, Tomasello has also gathered 
evidence to support the claim that human beings – specifically, human children – are 
naturally motivated to act relevantly in joint attentional frames. In an observational study, 
for example, Carpenter et al. asked parents to record their observations of their infants' 
pointing in regular social interactions. Such instances included: 
Example 14: At age 11.5 months, J points to the door as Dad is making 
preparations to leave. Gloss: Attend to the door; Dad's going out it soon…
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Example 19: At age 13.5 months, while Mom is looking for a missing 
refrigerator magnet, L points to a basket of fruit where it is (hidden under 
the fruit). Gloss: Attend to the basket of fruit; it's there. 
Example 20: At age 14 months, two different children, J and L, have 
accidents when a parent is not looking; when the parent comes to 
investigate, the infant points to the offending object (i.e., the thing he 
bumped his head on, or the thing that fell down). Gloss: Attend to that 
object; it hurt me/fell down. (Tomasello 2008: 114-115) 
In all such examples, the child's declarative comment expressed by pointing (as 
interpreted by the researchers in the accompanying gloss) appeared to the researchers to 
be relevant to the unfolding joint attentional scene. While there is no way to conclusively 
verify the researchers' glosses, Tomasello finds their interpretations persuasive and 
argues that this research indicates that human children act relevantly in addition to 
assuming relevance in the actions of others. 
 Tomasello also presents evidence that human children approach social 
interactions with the assumption that other individuals will be helpful towards them. He 
cites a 2005 study, which found that fourteen-month-old children can find a desired toy 
by following the pointing or ostensive eye gaze of an adult to spot where the toy is 
hidden. In each trial, the child subject was shown two possible buckets, one of which 
contained the toy and the other of which was empty. The researcher next indicated, either 
by gazing back and forth between bucket and child or by intentionally pointing, which 
container held the object the child wanted. The subject was then encouraged to pick a 
bucket to find the toy, and the results showed that children selected the correct container 
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at a ratio far above chance. This finding contrasts with the control setup for the 
experiment, wherein the researcher did not appear to intentionally indicate the correct 
bucket – although he still had an arm or line of sight extended towards it – and children 
guessed right roughly half of the time (Behne, Carpenter, and Tomasello 2005). From 
this, Tomasello concludes that human children naturally assume helpfulness in the 
intentional actions of others, a trait that they bring with them to the task of acquiring 
language (Tomasello 2008: 131). 
 Finally, Tomasello argues that human infants themselves are helpfully motivated 
towards other individuals. He claims that Example 19 in the Carpenter et al. study cited 
above, wherein the child L pointed to the location of the item her mother was seeking, is 
indicative of a general human tendency to offer helpful information to their social 
partners. In an experimental study performed by members of Tomasello's team to 
investigate this claim, a series of 18-month-old human infants observed an adult 
researcher (whom they had just met) struggling to accomplish some task, such as 
reaching for an accidentally dropped marker or bumping into a cabinet with his hands full 
while trying to open it. 22 of the 24 infants studied helped the adult perform the task – in 
this case, picking up and returning the marker or opening the cabinet door – and they did 
so almost immediately, "before the adult either looked to them or verbalized his 
problem… Thus, the experimenter never verbally asked for help, and for the vast majority 
of helping acts, eye contact (as a subtle means of soliciting help) was also unnecessary" 
(Warneken and Tomasello 2006). Each task also had a control setup, such as the adult 
dropping the marker intentionally or bumping into the cabinet in the process of doing 
some other activity. In these setups, the infants subjects did nothing, "showing that they 
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do not just like fetching [markers] or opening cabinets in general" (Tomasello 2009: 7). 
On the basis of such studies, Tomasello concludes that "children's early helping… is an 
outward expression of children's natural inclination to sympathize with others in strife" 
(Tomasello 2009: 13). In his view, human children at the time of their entry into language 
are therefore able and naturally motivated to a) act relevantly, b) assume relevance in 
others, c) act helpfully and d) assume helpfulness in others. All four of these, claims 
Tomasello, are required for the understanding and acquisition of linguistic utterances. 
 As shown in the preceding section, Tomasello currently believes that apes have 
the cognitive skill-set required to engage in joint attentional frames: they show evidence 
of analogizing from self to other, they recognize their own intentions, and they have an 
understanding of the intentionality of others. The next logical question for Tomasello is 
therefore whether within the domain of joint attentional frames non-human apes are able 
to understand linguistic utterances. According to his current theory of language 
acquisition, this ability has the four components a – d mentioned immediately above: 
acting relevantly, assuming relevance in others, acting helpfully, and assuming 
helpfulness in others. He has therefore conducted research to test for these four 
behavioral tendencies in the great apes. 
 To explore the issue of whether chimpanzees act relevantly toward other 
individuals, Tomasello would say, is to question whether apes ground their 
communicative acts "in the immediate joint attentional frame in a manner sensitive to the 
current perspective, knowledge, and expectations of the listener" (Tomasello 2003: 293). 
To test for this behavior, researchers associated with Tomasello devised an experiment 
wherein an ape subject who had learned to use visual gestures to beg for food from 
MICHAEL TOMASELLO ON LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT 28 
human researchers was matched with a food-holding researcher who would either be 
facing the ape (condition 1) or facing away from the ape (condition 2). The study found 
that ape subjects "were highly sensitive to front–back body orientation of the 
experimenter and gestured preferentially when the experimenter was facing them. These 
findings corroborate previous studies that have shown that chimpanzees and orangutans 
use visual gestures toward partners who are facing them…but use more vocalizations to 
partners that are not facing them… [In addition], subjects significantly reduced their 
behavioral output when the experimenter left the room" (Kaminski, Call, and Tomasello 
2004). Tomasello cites this finding as evidence that apes do in fact take into account such 
factors as the perspective of their audience when attempting to communicate (Tomasello 
2008: 47). Although to my knowledge he has never described apes' actions in terms of 
relevance, his claim that they engage in practical reasoning to communicate by 
"determining what the other wants, the reason he wants it, and what he is likely to do 
next" (Tomasello 2008: 49) echoes his comment that speech acts are relevant due to the 
speaker's sensitivity "to the current perspective, knowledge, and expectations of the 
listener." Given those arguments, it seems fair to attribute to Tomasello the composite 
claim that apes act relevantly. 
 According to Tomasello, there is also significant evidence that apes assume that 
the acts of others are relevant, at least to the others' own goal(s). For example, in an 
experiment similar to that of Behne, Call, and Tomasello (2005), researchers presented a 
series of individual chimpanzee subjects with a choice of two identical opaque cups, one 
of which held a desired item of food. The chimpanzees learned that they could keep the 
food item discovered if they picked the correct cup, but that they would only be allowed  
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to guess once per trial. In the "competitive condition," the subject learned that an 
experimenter also wanted the food item, and that the human would reach for the correct 
cup to get it. When a second experimenter moved the platform holding the cups so that 
the first experimenter could extend an arm as though reaching for the correct cup, but 
could not actually grab it, the chimpanzees were able to correctly guess which container 
held the food. In Tomasello's analysis, the apes "were thus able to infer: she wants to get 
into that bucket for herself; therefore, there must be something good in there" (Tomasello 
2008: 41). In other, non-competitive situations (discussed in more detail below), the 
chimpanzees did not appear to interpret a researcher's outstretched arm as an indication of 
where the food item was hidden. However, Tomasello argues that when chimpanzees 
understood the researcher was motivated to obtain the food for herself, they were able to 
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assume that her reaching was relevant to her goal, and to learn from that assumption 
information that was of benefit to themselves (namely, the location of the food). Thus, he 
concludes, chimpanzees assume relevance in the intentional acts of others. 
 As noted above, Tomasello defines the helpfulness which he claims is a 
requirement for language acquisition as intentional relevance to the other party's 
intentional goal in a social interaction. In the studies of human infants, for example, test 
subjects intentionally performed actions that were designed to assist another party in 
accomplishing his or her goals, and seemed to reason that the intentional acts of the other 
party were designed to help them accomplish their own goals. Tomasello has looked for 
similar behaviors of helpfulness in chimpanzees, but argues based on his findings that the 
species fails to meet the behavioral requirements to merit the attribution of a helpful 
motivation. In a study currently awaiting publication, for example, Bullinger, 
Zimmermann, Kaminski, and Tomasello designed an experiment wherein a human 
needed a tool to fetch something, but appeared to not know the tool's location. A 
chimpanzee test subject knew of the human's need and could, if so inclined, point to the 
tool's location. The evidence for this knowledge is that the researchers found that apes 
reliably pointed to the location under the test condition of the tool being used to fetch 
something for the ape itself. But when the human wanted to use the tool to fetch 
something for herself instead, the apes failed to point to it, "which is consistent with the 
interpretation that their pointing is really a directive" rather than an offer of helpful 
information to the other party (Tomasello 2009: 17). That is, in Tomasello's opinion, 
although chimpanzees assume and can act with relevance, they do not appear to be 
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motivated to communicatively share with another information that would be relevant to 
the other's own goals. In this sense, Tomasello argues, they are not helpful. 
 Finally, Tomasello claims that chimpanzees do not assume that the behavior of 
others is intended to be helpful to the self – a key component of his account of how 
individuals understand unfamiliar linguistic expressions. In the object choice task 
presented by Hare and Tomasello (2004), for example, chimpanzee subjects were only 
able to reliably understand a human's reaching behavior and thus choose the correct 
container to find the hidden food item in the competitive condition where the human was 
assumed to want the food for herself. When an experimenter who had never competed 
with the ape for food pointed or gazed informatively – i.e., helpfully – toward the correct 
container, the ape seemed to follow the gesture and correctly identify the target of the 
human's attention. However, the chimpanzee would then pick a container at random, 
regardless of whether it was the attention target or not. Tomasello argues that such 
behavior indicates "that following the directionality of the point was not the problem; 
they just did not seem to understand its meaning, its relevance to their search for the food. 
It is as if the apes said to themselves, 'OK. There's a bucket. So what? Now where's the 
food?' …[The apes] were not able to infer: she wants me to know that the food is in the 
bucket" (Tomasello 2008: 39, emphasis in original). Tomasello observes that in the wild, 
chimpanzees compete with one another for food, rather than cooperate, and thus have no 
need for 
…something like the philosopher Paul Grice's principle of cooperation [in 
humans]: others are trying to be helpful by informing me of things 
relevant not to themselves but to their interlocutors. Chimpanzees do not 
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operate with [or assume that others are operating with] anything like a 
Gricean principle of cooperation – fittingly, in their natural worlds – and 
thus they have no basis for making the appropriate relevance inference. 
(Tomasello 2009: 18) 
Thus, in Tomasello's opinion, chimpanzees act with and assume relevance, but neither act 
helpfully nor assume helpful motivations in the actions of others. 
4.3 – Role Reversal Imitation 
 Although Tomasello asserts that making relevance assumptions is a necessary 
skill for a learner of language to have, he argues that this ability is not sufficient to 
explain how language develops as an intersubjective social phenomenon. He claims that, 
even if the members of a given species were able to establish joint attention with 
interactional others and to decipher speaker meanings within such interactions – and did 
so by relying on assumptions of relevance and helpfulness – they would still not develop 
what we call language unless they also possessed the ability and the motivation to imitate 
each other's communicative acts. Without this imitative foundation promoting stability of 
meaning across individuals and situational contexts, argues Tomasello, members of the 
species might freely and idiosyncratically invent their own utterances to suit their current 
needs, rather than use forms they have heard previously in the speech of others and/or 
used previously themselves. He contends that other individuals of this species would do 
their best to interpret unfamiliar speech acts as they occur, as prelinguistic human infants 
do, but that this task would be greatly complicated by the lack of stability in utterance 
form and meaning. In fact, Tomasello explicitly claims that stability is what enables, in 
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part, the listener's understanding of meaning: "In general," he observes, "if a child were 
born into a world in which the same event never recurred, the same object never appeared 
twice, [or] adults never used the same language in the same context, it is difficult to see 
how that child – whatever her cognitive capabilities – could acquire a natural language" 
(Tomasello 1999: 109). According to Tomasello, members of a species capable of 
language must be able to use "the same language in the same context" across interactions, 
and they must be motivated to do so.  
 Tomasello has written extensively on the topic of role-reversal imitation, the 
process by which "an individual [who] comprehends how a communicator is using some 
communicative device toward her… then reproduces that use in her own communication 
back toward others in kind" (Tomasello 2008: 103). To do so, argues Tomasello, the 
language learner must construct a mental representation of the communicative device that 
includes the roles of its speaker and listener(s), and then substitute into that representation 
the relevant parties for his or her own use of the act. Role-reversal imitation is thus a 
specialized form of imitation, in which the imitator substitutes the self in the role of 
performer in his or her conceptualization of the action to perform, and also substitutes 
some other party – prototypically the original performer – into his or her own original 
role as recipient. Tomasello claims that a typical instance of imitation – as when a child 
first sees an adult playing with a toy and then proceeds to play with the toy in the same 
way – does not qualify as role-reversal, as the imitating individual substitutes only 
himself or herself for the original actor in his or her mental representation of the action, 
while the target of the action and the goal in relation to that target remain the same. Yet 
unlike in this situation, Tomasello asserts that "the adult's goal in using [a communicative 
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device] involves the child's attentional state. Consequently, if the child simply substitutes 
herself for the adult she will end up directing the [communication] to herself – which is 
not what is needed" (Tomasello 1999: 105). To engage in role-reversal imitation, argues 
Tomasello, an individual must view a social interaction from a 'bird's eye view' in which 
she "knows that she is in some sense equivalent to others [and that] actors can substitute 
for one another in acts of imitation and role reversal" (Tomasello et al. 2005: 689).  
 As with the other elements of Tomasello's theory that were mentioned above, 
however, the mere ability to engage in role-reversal imitation is not sufficient to explain 
the occurrence of the behavior in actual speakers. Rather, communicators must be 
motivated to engage in this kind of imitation. According to Tomasello, the motivation to 
imitate (in general) can more properly be construed as the motivation to adhere to norms, 
which arises from "mutual expectations about behavior and a concern for reputation plus 
pressure to conform to group expectations" (Tomasello 2008: 212). That is, once a 
language-capable individual understands the meaning behind a communicative act, he or 
she will be motivated by a social pressure toward conformity to produce the same action 
when he or she wants to convey the same meaning, and so will not invent an original, ad 
hoc communicative device to achieve this purpose. The social pressure to conform, 
Tomasello suggests, reflects "a kind of group identity and social rationality" that is most 
apparent in collaborative acts requiring multiple individuals to work together to 
accomplish a mutual goal. Thus, according to Tomasello, beings that collaborate with one 
another to pursue common goals must possess a strong sense of group identity which, in 
turn, produces the motivation to imitate in accordance with perceived social norms. 
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 As Tomasello believes that human infants are capable of understanding the 
meaning behind a communicative act, he asserts that they should be able to express the 
same meaning through role-reversal imitation as long as a) they know that they are "in 
some sense equivalent to others", which underlies the motivation to conform and b) they 
are able to learn imitatively from the actions of others. This first requirement, 
identification of the self with others, has already been mentioned as one of the cognitive 
capabilities Tomasello ascribes to intention-reading individuals, and so should need no 
further mention here beyond the reminder that Tomasello has found that both humans and 
apes seem to act upon such identification. He has also gathered evidence purported to 
show that human infants satisfy requirement b, i.e., possession of the ability to learn 
imitatively. For example, in an experimental study by Meltzoff (1988), later modified by 
Carpenter, Nagell and Tomasello (1998), eleven-to-fourteen-month-old infants who 
observed an adult researcher bend at the waist, touch his head to a wall panel, and thereby 
turn on a light, later proceeded to turn on the light through the same sequence of actions, 
"even though it was an unusual and awkward behavior and even though it would it would 
have been easier and more natural for them simply to push the panel with their hand" 
(Tomasello 1999: 82). The experimental setup emphasized the "goal-directed nature" of 
the imitated action, and the researchers tested and rejected the alternate hypothesis that 
the children were naturally motivated to imitate witnessed actions beyond the goal of 
turning on the light. They also tested for, and rejected, the idea that touching one's head 
to the wall panel was a behavior a human child would enjoy performing outside of any 
imitative context. Tomasello comments: 
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One interpretation of this [imitative] behavior is that infants understood (a) 
that the adult had the goal of illuminating the light; (b) that he chose one 
means for doing so from among other possible means; and (c) that if they 
had the same goal they could choose the same means – an act in which the 
child imagines herself in the place of the other. (Tomasello 1999: 82) 
Tomasello contends that experiments such as these demonstrate the capability of human 
infants to engage in imitative learning, and so role reversal imitation is well within their 
capabilities as intention-reading individuals who understand communicative meanings 
and identify with others. 
 If, as Tomasello claims, human infants engage in role reversal imitation in their 
acquisition of language, then they must be motivated to use their imitative skills in that 
manner. According to his theory elaborated upon above, such motivation would also be 
manifested as a sensitivity to social norms, and would ultimately be expressed in 
collaborative action between individuals toward a common goal. In support of the claim 
that social norms govern human behavior, Tomasello observes, "[I]f  I attempt to 
communicate with you – I say 'Hey, Ethel' and you look at me – when I then produce my 
gesture or utterance, you cannot just ignore me as though I did not attempt to 
communicate… [And] if I make a small request, like 'Please pass the salt' at the dinner 
table (either in speech or gesture), you cannot really reply with "No" – unless you make 
some excuse for why you cannot comply in this circumstance (and knowing this, I must 
make reasonable requests)" (Tomasello 2008: 92). He elaborates upon additional norms 
that humans seem to follow in communicative interactions, and finally concludes: 
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Thus, from the production side, we humans must communicate with others 
or we will be thought pathological; we must request only things that are 
reasonable or we will be thought rude; and we must attempt to inform and 
share things with others in ways that are relevant and appropriate or we 
will be thought socially weird and will have no friends. From the 
comprehension side, we again must participate, or we will be thought 
pathological; and we must help, accept offered help and information, and 
share feelings with others, or we will risk social estrangement. The simple 
fact is that, as in many domains of human social life, mutual expectations, 
when put into the public arena, turn into policeable social norms and 
obligations. (Tomasello 2008: 93) 
According to Tomasello, experimental tests of human children support these claims, 
showing that "children do not just follow norms as they encounter them, but in new 
situations they actively seek out what they are supposed to do – what the social norms 
and rules are in the situation – so that they can behave accordingly" (Tomasello 2009:
35). In one particular experiment that Tomasello highlights, three-year-old children were 
taught how to play a one-player game, after which they were introduced to a puppet 
announcing that it would play the game now too. When the puppet played its game in a 
different way than what the children were used to, many of them raised objections to the 
puppet's behavior (Rakoczy, Warneken, and Tomasello 2008). According to Tomasello, 
"The children's language when they objected demonstrated clearly that they were not just 
expressing their personal displeasure at a deviation. They made generic, normative 
declarations like, 'It doesn't work like that,' 'One can't do that,' and so forth. They do not 
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merely disapprove of the puppet playing the game differently; he is playing it 
improperly" (Tomasello 2009: 37). Although the children in this experiment are well 
beyond the prelinguistic phase, Tomasello claims that the sensitivity to norms that they 
display is indicative of human infants in general, including those in the first year of life 
who are beginning to acquire language. On the basis of such findings, Tomasello 
concludes that human children are keenly aware of the set of behavior-guiding norms that 
restrict their social actions. 
 According to Tomasello, such norms are indicative of a sense of group identity 
that also surfaces in acts of collaboration between individuals. "In shared cooperative 
activities," he writes, "we have a joint goal that creates an interdependence among us – 
indeed, creates an 'us.' If we are carrying a table to the bedroom, I cannot simply drop it 
and run off without hurting us and our goal" (Tomasello 2009: 41). Warneken and 
Tomasello (2006) tested what amounts to the same proposition in an experimental setup, 
by having an adult experimenter first participate in some activity (either a social game or 
an instrumental task) with a 14-to-24-month-old child, and then abruptly stop. According 
to Tomasello, the child subjects responded to such a shift in the researcher's behavior by 
"actively encourag[ing] him to reengage… suggesting that they had formed with him a 
shared goal to which they now wanted him to recommit" (Tomasello 2009: 64-65). He 
also notes that this behavior was the same whether the collaborative activity had been the 
instrumental task in which adult and child were working together to achieve some prize 
or the social game that had no practical goal beyond the playing itself. In fact, the child 
subjects "sometimes turned the instrumental tasks into social games by placing the 
obtained reward back into the apparatus to start the activity again; the collaborative 
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activity itself was more rewarding than the instrumental goal" (Ibid.). In Tomasello's 
opinion, therefore, humans are collaborative agents with a conception of group identity 
that motivates imitative adherence to social norms. As such, he says, we are motivated to 
engage in role reversal imitation in the acquisition of language. 
 Turning our attention back to apes, it is unclear whether Tomasello believes that 
chimpanzees are unable to engage in human-like role-reversal imitation. After all, as 
Tomasello defines it, role-reversal imitation requires the would-be imitator to have an 
understanding of the other's communicative meaning in some situation, so Tomasello 
might conceivably argue that because they do not assume the helpfulness of others, apes 
are unable to infer meaning in this way. If so, that argument would entail the assertion 
that role-reversal imitation never occurs in non-human apes – and thus cannot be tested 
for – but not that chimpanzees do not have the cognitive capacities that would be required 
to perform the behavior otherwise. In fact, Tomasello does appear to grant such 
capacities to apes, in that he describes them as capable of both imitative learning and 
identification with others. The latter is accounted for in Section 3.1 of this thesis in 
relation to chimpanzee self-to-other analogizing, while the former is one of the latest 
capacities that Tomasello's research team has experimentally found indicated in the 
behavior of chimps. 
 In a 2007 experiment, for example, Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, and Tomasello 
studied eight enculturated, or human-raised, chimpanzees, to determine whether the apes 
were rational imitators when performing an action on a newly introduced device. The 
devices were grouped in pairs that were highly similar, e.g., a box that lit up when 
pressed on its top and a box that made noise when activated in the same fashion. The test 
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subjects watched as an experimenter interacted with one of the devices using some body 
part besides his hands, for instance activating one of the boxes by pressing his forehead to 
its top. While interacting with the device in this fashion, the experimenter's hands would 
either be free or otherwise occupied. (The chimpanzee subject would later be shown the 
experimenter interacting with the other object of the pair, with the opposite hands  
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condition.) The goal of the experiment was to see whether and to what extent the 
enculturated apes would imitate the actions of the human researchers upon the devices. 
When the apes were subsequently given the chance to interact with the devices 
themselves, there were three possible outcomes: the subjects could imitate the earlier 
actions of the humans fully, rationally, or not at all. For this experiment, full imitation 
was defined as copying every aspect of the previous action, regardless of whether the 
human had been constrained by having his hands occupied at the time. Rational imitation, 
by contrast, was defined as imitation in which the test subject seemed to take the original 
situation's constraints into account. For example, if the experimenter's hands had been 
full when accessing the device, a rational imitator would assume that using hands instead 
of some other body part was likely an acceptable strategy for oneself to pursue. If, 
however, the experimenter's hands had been free and yet not used in the original 
condition, a rational imitator would assume that the specific body part that was used had 
been chosen freely by the human, and that the action must be imitated with that body part 
exactly. In other words, a rational imitator would perform differentially based on his 
analysis of the test condition as free or constrained, while a full imitator would instead 
imitate the entirety of the action he saw, regardless. A non-imitator, of course, would not 
reliably imitate any aspect of the situation. 
 At the conclusion of the test trials, the research team concluded that their 
chimpanzee subjects could reliably "imitate others rationally, taking into account the 
reasons behind their actions" (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, and Tomasello 2007). 
Although these subjects were enculturated apes, whose behaviors are different from those 
of individuals in the wild, there is no reason to assume that their cognitive capacity for 
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imitative learning is a cultural artifact rather than a nature property of chimpanzee 
cognition. To my knowledge, Tomasello himself has never ascribed to chimpanzees the 
capacity for role-reversal imitation, yet their possession of that capacity would seem to be 
a logical entailment of his current theory and experimental findings. If chimpanzees can 
imitate as well as identify with others, then Tomasello's current theory would support the 
notion that their species has the cognitive capacity (although perhaps not the right social 
environment) for role reversal imitation. 
 Despite these findings, Tomasello argues that nonhuman apes do not have the 
cooperative motivation required for normative behavior like role reversal imitation, and 
thus do not engage in such behavior. In the Warneken and Tomasello (2006) study cited 
above, in which human researchers synchronized their behavior with a test subject in a 
problem-solving task and then abruptly stopped, the research team tested for awareness 
of norms in young human-raised chimpanzees as well as in human children. They found 
that, unlike the 14-to-24-month old children, the chimpanzees did not react to their 
partner's sudden abandonment of the joint activity between researcher and subject. 
Tomasello reports that "when the human partner stopped participating, no chimpanzee 
ever made a communicative attempt to reengage her – even in cases where they were 
seemingly highly motivated to obtain the goal" (Tomasello 2009: 64). In Tomasello's 
opinion, this finding suggests both that the chimpanzee subjects had not formed a joint 
goal with the human experimenter and that they felt no pressure to conform to group 
expectations and act collaboratively. He observes that when the researchers sought to 
engage the chimps with the tasks in the experiment that had been designed as social 
games rather than as instrumental tasks, the nonhuman subjects "showed no interest… 
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basically declining to participate" (Ibid.). Collaboration for its own sake, Tomasello 
concludes, is not a significant motivating factor for chimpanzees. 
 Tomasello also asserts that apes are not motivated by social norms of fairness, 
citing a chimpanzee study based on the classic ultimatum game from economic game 
theory. In the classic setup, two strangers who cannot see one another are assigned the 
roles of proposer and responder for the duration of the game. The proposer is presented 
with a lump sum of money and must propose what percentage of it she will give to the 
other party, and what percentage she will keep for herself. The responder is then 
presented with the proposal, which he can either accept or reject. If he accepts the 
proposer's terms then each party gets to keep the agreed upon sums, but if he rejects the 
proposal, neither the proposer nor the responder walks away with anything. Although it 
would thus be in the responder's best interest to accept any offer (as any cash gain should 
be better than none), in actual practice responders tend to reject any offer lower than 
30%, a behavior which Tomasello interprets as enforcing the norm of fairness. He notes 
that, perhaps due to their anticipation of such enforcement, proposers typically make an 
offer of around 50% to their unseen partner (Tomasello 2009: 32-33). Tomasello 
conducted a similar experiment with chimpanzee subjects in which one ape was given a 
choice between two trays, each with a pre-established division of ten desirable food items 
for the subject and his or her partner in an adjacent room. For example, in one condition, 
the subject could choose either a tray that held eight grapes for him- or herself and two 
for the other ape, or a tray that held five grapes for each. Once the "proposer" had 
selected a tray and pulled it toward the two rooms as far as he or she could, halfway, the 
"responder" in the adjacent room could choose to either complete the transaction by 
MICHAEL TOMASELLO ON LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT 44 
pulling the tray the other half of the way toward both parties or reject the offer by not 
pulling. According to Tomasello, the chimpanzees he tested acted as rational maximizers: 
in the role of responder in the ultimatum game for desirable food items, they accepted 
any offer higher than 0% (but not 0%, indicating that the subjects were not just utilizing 
the acceptance mechanism arbitrarily or for its own sake). Tomasello comments that 
chimpanzees are thus very unlike humans in the playing of the ultimatum game: they do 
not systematically make fair offers to conspecific responders; they do not systematically 
reject unfair offers from conspecific proposers; and they very rarely (2% of trials in this 
experiment) exhibit signs of anger at an unfair offer. Based on these findings, Tomasello 
concludes that the apes have no human-like norm of fairness motivating their cooperation 
and collaboration with others (Jensen, Call, and Tomasello 2007). More generally, he 
asserts, "There is no evidence that nonhuman primates create anything resembling a 
public space in which considerations of reputation and normative sanctions are at play" 
(Tomasello 2008: 216). Without the notion of group identity that these social norms 
would imply, states Tomasello, chimpanzees are not motivated to conform imitatively to 
group expectations, including the expectation that a communicator who understands the 
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meaning behind a communicative device will produce an utterance of the same form to 
convey the same meaning. Therefore, he concludes, there is no evidence that a stable 
language-like system of communication could ever arise among a group of chimpanzees. 
4.4 – Pattern-finding and grammaticalization 
 As shown above, Tomasello believes that the word-learning competence of 
humans is the result of many different cognitive and interpersonal capacities, none of 
which serves the explicit purpose of language acquisition alone, and not all of which are 
found in chimpanzees. In essence, Tomasello's explanation for the inability of nonhuman 
apes to acquire words in a human-like fashion is founded on his conviction that they do 
not act helpfully or assume helpfulness in others and that they lack the capacity to form 
joint goals and conform to group expectations. At the same time, Tomasello is aware that 
a full language does not consist of words alone. He agrees with Chomsky that a theory of 
human linguistic uniqueness should be based not on claims about lexical acquisition, but 
rather on claims about the acquisition of syntactic competence. However, a key 
component of Tomasello's theory of language acquisition is the claim that syntax, 
prosody, and other non-lexical features of language are acquired through the same 
general processes as are words. Tomasello asserts that such features are not only 
algebraic structures that organize the linear combination of words, but are also meaning-
bearing elements of language in their own right. He observes that "if I say to you 'The 
dax got mibbed by the gazzer,' you know – without knowing the meaning of a single 
content word – that the gazzer did something (called mibbing) to the dax (and we have 
entered that event from the perspective of the dax, as patient)" (Tomasello 2008: 297). 
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Tomasello argues that this sort of knowledge is held by all native speakers of English, 
and that it is particularly the knowledge of the grammatical structure's meaning. He 
likens meaning-bearing syntactic constructions to lexical items in a language, concluding 
"that the construction itself – the abstract pattern – is a linguistic symbol, albeit a 
complex one with internal structure… But since abstract constructions are essentially 
patterns of use, they cannot be imitated directly, but rather children must (re-)construct 
them across individual learning experiences with different exemplars of the construction" 
(Tomasello 2008: 297-8). 
 For example, Tomasello claims the English construction "X got Y-ed by Z" has a 
specific meaning, which is in part that Y-ing is an action Z performed upon X. He argues 
that language learners, hearing repeated instances of this pattern (e.g. "The baby got 
scolded by the mommy," "I got slapped by her," etc.), will be able to decipher the 
pattern's meaning like they would the meaning of a single word, "using their general 
skills of intention-reading and pattern-finding. They understand the communicative 
functions of utterances… by reading the intentions of the speaker. They then find patterns 
across item-based constructions by schematizing and making analogies" (Tomasello 
2003: 143). The requisite pattern-finding and analogizing abilities, Tomasello writes, "are 
necessary for children to find patterns in the way adults use linguistic symbols across 
different utterances, and so to construct the grammatical (abstract) dimensions of human 
linguistic competence" (Tomasello 2003: 4). Tomasello contends that this type of 
acquisition, which so closely resembles word-learning as he sees it, is the only way 
children can learn a language, for he does not believe such grammatical structures to be 
innate. Flatly disagreeing with Chomsky's notion of an evolved Universal Grammar in 
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humans, Tomasello asserts that children acquire language "within the constraints of 
preexisting human cognition and sociality… It is not that the evolution of some kind of 
innate syntactic template is impossible, it is just that currently there is no evidence for it 
empirically… and no need for it at all [theoretically]" (Tomasello 2008: 313). He 
concludes that "although many aspects of human linguistic competence have indeed 
evolved biologically, specific grammatical principles and constructions have not" (Ibid.). 
 Due to Tomasello's conviction that syntactic structures are acquired in the same 
fashion as are words, there is little specifically concerning syntactic acquisition to add to 
the present discussion of his theory of the comparative linguistic capacities of apes and 
humans. According to Tomasello, any individual capable of acquiring lexical items will 
already possess the capacities required to acquire patterns of syntax as well, provided also 
that that individual is able to recognize those patterns in the speech around him or her. He 
defines the requisite pattern-recognizing skills as ones of categorization, which include 
but are not limited to "the ability to create analogies (structure mappings) across two or 
more complex wholes, based on the similar functional roles of some elements in these 
different wholes" (Tomasello 2003: 4). As support for the human capacity for this 
behavior, Tomasello cites an article by Gentner and Markman (1997) which offers a 
variety of examples of children who are in the process of learning language and who 
display the ability to analogize in non-linguistic domains. The researchers mention: 
Lucas, a 25-month-old child, plays with a new toy that has six colored 
doors. Each door has its own key-a red key for a red door a blue key for a 
blue door, and so on. Lucas opens each door with the key of the 
corresponding color. Then he sees a seventh white key. He carefully 
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inspects the toy from top to bottom . Then he turns to his parents and asks, 
"Where the white door?" (Gentner and Markman 1997: 48) 
Tomasello argues that this child's analogizing behavior is representative of the mental 
processes of categorization that a language learner must bring to bear on the linguistic 
input he or she is hearing. He also cites experimental studies on the pattern-finding 
abilities of prelinguistic humans in the auditory domain, such as a study by Marcus et al 
(1999). In that experiment, researchers played for seven-month-old human infants a 
three-minute speech stream of nonsense words containing trisyllabic units of the form 
ABB, like wididi or delili. They then played two other speech streams, one of which had 
other ABB nonce words like bapopo and the other of which utilized the same syllables 
but in a different order. The study was set up so that the infant subjects could look at 
either sound source in the latter part of the experiment, and the researchers found that 
children preferred to look toward the source playing the earlier pattern. Tomasello 
concludes "that prelinguistic infants are able to find patterns in auditory stimuli of an 
abstract nature, which would seem to be a necessary (although not sufficient) skill in the 
learning of abstract grammatical patterns in linguistic stimuli" (Tomasello 2003: 30). 
Along with the capacities which Tomasello argues are required for a being to learn 
individual words, he claims that pattern-finding skills of this type are necessary for the 
acquisition of language. 
 Nevertheless, Tomasello does not consider human pattern-finding skills to be an 
essential component of his account of human linguistic uniqueness. Rather, he thinks that 
such skills "are evolutionarily fairly old, probably possessed in some form by all primates 
at the very least… allow[ing] organisms to categorize many different aspects of their 
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worlds into a manageable number of kinds of things and events" (Tomasello 2003: 4). In 
support of this claim, Tomasello cites a number of studies which conducted tests similar 
to those of Marcus et al. on cotton-top tamarin monkeys and which found comparable 
results of the subjects' pattern-finding skills. He describes these skills as "very deep-
seated" evolutionarily (Tomasello 2003: 30), and hence, likely also present in the great 
apes. To investigate ape pattern-finding skills and particularly the comprehension of 
English syntax, Tomasello analyzed the performance of the bonobo Kanzi, who has 
displayed some degree of competence at understanding spoken English and at using a 
lexigram keyboard to communicate, in response to vocal requests involving two objects 
whose roles could easily be reversed, such as "Put some milk in the water." He 
concluded:  
Kanzi's performance indicated that he was doing more than simply 
responding to the words in the sentences in some plausible way; he 
understood the use of word order as a contrastive symbolic device. For 
example, Kanzi responded correctly to the two requests: 'Put the hat on 
your ball' and 'Put the ball on the hat.'… Kanzi knows [that in English] the 
object being put (e.g., 'hat') is named first and the place it is being put 
(e.g., 'on the ball') is named only afterwards, even when the object and 
location could easily have been reversed. He knows that the person biting 
or chasing is mentioned before 'bite' or 'chase,' and the one being bitten or 
chased is mentioned only after. He knows these things presumably 
because he has seen one order paired with one version of the key event 
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(e.g., X chasing Y) and another order paired with another version of the 
same event (e.g., Y chasing X). (Tomasello and Call 1997: 267) 
Tomasello does not believe that Kanzi is a fully linguistic creature, and he notes that the 
bonobo "uses mostly single words… he uses his lexigrams mostly to request rather than 
to report or make comments… his production of symbol combinations shows no signs of 
grammatical marking, and his comprehension of symbol combinations shows word-
specific structure only" (Tomasello and Call 1997: 268). Nevertheless, he takes the 
bonobo's competence in comprehending certain English structures as an indication that 
great apes share the pattern-finding abilities which he takes to be necessary (if not 
sufficient) components of the human capacity for language-learning.
 In Tomasello's view, besides the pattern-finding abilities that he claims humans 
share with all primates, the question of syntactic acquisition is not truly a separate matter 
from that of the acquisition of words. Therefore, in his theoretical argument, the ability to 
acquire syntactical structures does not require a separate component in the explanation 
for human linguistic uniqueness. Although syntax, like language itself, appears only in 
the communication of humans, Tomasello does not consider either to be innately human 
properties. Rather, in his view, syntactic structures and words alike are acquired by 
human children because our species possesses many particular cognitive and 
interpersonal capabilities, some of which – but not all – are shared with apes. 
5 – Discussion and conclusions 
 Tomasello's current explanation for human linguistic uniqueness, as a corollary of 
his overall account of language acquisition and development in humans, is strengthened 
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by years of experimental research. His research team has tested human infants and found 
evidence for many of the myriad cognitive and cooperative abilities which he claims are 
requisite for a learner of language. Similar tests of nonhuman apes have yielded limited 
or negative evidence for the creatures' capacities to act helpfully, assume helpfulness in 
others, form joint goals, and construct and conform to group expectations. Because his 
experimental data show that there are many cognitive and interpersonal skills which 
nonhuman apes share with humans, there is compelling, if not conclusive, support for 
Tomasello's claim that it is the apes' lack of these cooperative abilities which precludes 
their acquisition of a human-like language. 
 Although my focus in this thesis has been on Tomasello's theoretical account, 
rather than on the plausibility of the experimental findings he has claimed, it is worth 
pointing out that his research data and his specific conclusions about nonhuman primate 
socio-cognitive capacities have not been universally accepted. For example, although 
Tomasello claims that nonhuman apes do not act helpfully toward other individuals, a 
recent experimental study on food-sharing behaviors in captive bonobos found that when 
given a choice between monopolizing a desirable food source and voluntarily opening a 
door to let a conspecific share the food, the apes preferred the latter option. The 
researchers noted that the bonobos may have shared the food "in an attempt to receive 
favors in the future from the recipients or due to a more altruistic motivation" (Hare and 
Kwetuenda 2010). Primatologist Frans de Waal relates anecdotal and experimental 
evidence that supports this proposal and which contrasts sharply with the lack of ape 
helpfulness described by Tomasello: 
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[Apes] seem to monitor their interactions more closely and keep better 
track of each individual's contributions to common goals [than do 
monkeys]. Chimpanzees, for example, regularly break up fights over food 
without taking any of it. I once saw an adolescent female interrupt a 
quarrel between two youngsters over a leafy branch. She took the branch 
away from them, broke it in two, then handed each one a part. Did she just 
want to stop the fight, or did she understand something about [fair] 
distribution? There's even one observation of a bonobo worried about 
getting too much. While being tested in a cognitive laboratory, a female 
received plenty of milk and raisins but felt the eyes of her friends on her, 
who were watching from a distance. After a while, she refused all rewards. 
Looking at the experimenter, she kept gesturing to the others until they too 
got some of the goodies. Only then did she finish hers. (de Waal 2009: 
190) 
Frans de Waal also conducted a study on ape awareness of cultural norms by introducing 
a high-ranking female in a captive population of chimpanzees to a device that could be 
made to dispense food in two distinct ways and then demonstrating for her one particular 
method of accessing the device. Two distinct groups were studied in this fashion, with the 
female in each shown a different way of using the machine to procure food. Whiten, 
Horner, and de Waal (2005) studied the ways in which other individuals in each group 
subsequently accessed the device themselves, after having seen the female (and, over 
time, other individuals) use it. They found that there was a strong tendency for 
chimpanzees to adopt the method used by the rest of their group, and some individuals 
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who had first discovered the opposite method for themselves "went on to match the 
predominant approach of their companions, showing a conformity bias that is regarded as 
a hallmark of human culture" (Whiten, Horner, and de Waal 2005). These findings do not 
discredit Tomasello's experimental data, but they provide a wider context of research and 
conclusions into which his experimental studies should be placed, and they perhaps 
suggest the need for a more nuanced explanation of great ape socio-cognitive capacities 
than Tomasello currently provides. 
 There is also reason to be somewhat skeptical of Tomasello's research on human 
children, and of the specific conclusions he draws regarding the language acquisition 
process. For example, his current account places a great deal of importance on speakers' 
motivation to imitate the forms of others' communicative acts when they intend to convey 
the same meanings, which he calls using "the same language in the same context" 
(Tomasello 1999: 109). He claims that this motivation has its source in the language-
learning child's awareness of social norms and expectations, and he provides 
experimental evidence that children operate with such norms to a degree unmatched in 
chimpanzees (Rakoczy, Warneken, and Tomasello 2008; Warneken and Tomasello 
2006). Yet the children in these studies were all 14-months-old or older – some as old as 
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three years – which suggests that they had all begun to acquire language already. 
Although Tomasello's research is striking, the finding that language-learning children 
operate under norms of reciprocity does not indicate that children are aware of those 
norms before they enter into language, which is what Tomasello's account of language 
acquisition would require. In fact, Tomasello cites the work of Kagan (1981) in his 
discussion of helpfulness expectations to observe that human children "do not typically 
operate with these kinds of norms in other domains of activity until late in the preschool 
period… and so perhaps they are operating with something less than adult-like norms 
initially" (Tomasello 2008: 133 – 134). This hypothesis is supported by the research of 
Murnighan and Saxon (1998), who studied the bargaining behavior of human children 
engaged in an economic ultimatum game of the sort described above. Comparing the 
responses to proposed divisions of M&Ms by children in kindergarten, third grade, sixth 
grade, ninth grade, and college, the researchers found that the younger children were 
willing to accept much smaller offers than were older participants. In other words, the 
younger participants in the study behaved more like the chimpanzees that Jensen, Call, 
and Tomasello (2007) describe as "rational maximizers." This suggests that sensitivity to 
social norms is perhaps not an innate property of humans, but rather is one that develops 
in an individual over time as he or she is brought up in a social-interactional and 
cooperative environment – a proposal that, if true, would also cast doubt on the negative 
findings of normative behavior in chimpanzees who have not been raised in such an 
environment. In his published writings that I have read, Tomasello does not devote a 
great degree of time or attention to this point, but it is one with profound implications as 
to the plausibility of his overall account. 
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 Moreover, even if we were to accept all of Tomasello's findings and specific 
conclusions about great ape and human socio-cognitive capacities, there would still be 
reason to doubt his overall account of language acquisition. Although that account is 
attractive in that it avoids the postulation of a single, species-unique autonomous 
language endowment in humans, it does so at a significant explanatory cost, which to my 
knowledge is unacknowledged anywhere in print by Tomasello. This cost is the 
ascription to language-learners of a large number of mental abilities whose evolved 
purpose is not specifically language: abilities which, Tomasello claims, human infants 
must bring to bear on their linguistic environments by the time they are only a few 
months old. As is discussed in detail above, Tomasello argues that, for a child to be able 
to learn the language spoken around him or her, the infant must: 
i. understand that he or she is a producer of actions (page 13) 
ii. understand that he or she produces actions as a result of his or her own intentions, 
i.e. that he or she is "an intentional agent" (page 13) 
iii. understand that he or she makes active choices among possible actions to attain 
his or her goals (page 14) 
iv. understand that he or she chooses what to direct his or her attention to in pursuit 
of his or her goals (page 14) 
v. be able to analogize between himself or herself and others (page 13) 
vi. reason by analogy to himself or herself that others have intentions motivating 
their actions, and that those actions are actively chosen in their pursuit of 
particular goals (page 14) 
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vii. assume that others have intentions towards his or her own attentional and 
intentional states (page 14) 
viii. be able to jointly attend with another individual to some third entity (page 14) 
ix. assume that another's unfamiliar action, such as the production of an unfamiliar 
utterance, is (in addition to being consciously chosen and being motivated by the 
other's goals) intended by the other to be relevant to the current joint attentional 
frame (page 20) 
x. assume that others are taking into account his or her perspective, knowledge, and 
expectations when producing actions intended toward his or her attention and 
intentions (page 20) 
xi. understand that actions may be relevant to the joint attentional frame (page 20) 
xii. be able to act relevantly to the current joint attentional frame (page 21) 
xiii. take into account the perspective, knowledge, and expectations of others when 
interacting with them in a joint attentional frame (page 21) 
xiv. be motivated to helpfully inform other individuals of items relevant to them (page 
21) 
xv. be motivated to act helpfully toward other individuals in general (page 21) 
xvi. assume that others are acting helpfully toward him or her (page 21) 
xvii. assume that others are using their utterances to helpfully inform him or her of 
items relevant to himself or herself (page 21) 
xviii. assume that there is a mutual benefit in cooperating with others communicatively 
(page 21) 
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xix. be able to use the communicative context of a joint attentional frame (combined 
with the abilities and assumptions noted above) to determine the meaning of an 
unfamiliar utterance (page 23) 
xx. recognize that actors can substitute for one another in acts of imitation and role 
reversal (page 33) 
xxi. be able to imitate the actions of others (page 33) 
xxii. be able to construct a mental representation of communicative devices heard in 
the speech of others (page 33) 
xxiii. be able to engage in role-reversal imitation by substituting speaker for listener and 
vice versa in his or her mental representation of the speech act and then 
imitatively performing that act (page 34) 
xxiv. possess a sense of group identity and social rationality that motivates and governs 
his or her participation in collaborative activities (page 34) 
xxv. recognize and respect social norms, and so attempt to imitate the linguistic 
conventions of others (page 34) 
xxvi. recognize and mentally reconstruct patterns across repeated social interactions 
(page 46) 
xxvii. be able to apply pattern-finding abilities to the linguistic environment to discover 
conventional syntactic patterns (page 46) 
 By adopting this detailed account of language acquisition, Tomasello is able to 
identify the particular abilities (from the set of those he takes to be language-
foundational) which humans possess but which he claims the other great apes do not – on 
the above list, items xiv-xviii, xxiv, and xxv. However, it must be acknowledged that 
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Tomasello's theory is only plausible to the extent that we consider it likely for pre-
linguistic human infants to be able and motivated to engage in such complex mental 
behaviors. Although Tomasello has argued in several published works that his account of 
language development is preferable to that of Noam Chomsky, he cannot contest that 
most generativist theories only postulate the language learner's possession of a single 
required endowment, whereas Tomasello's account presupposes over twenty. Tomasello 
has endeavored to support each item in his account with experimental findings, but 
Ockham's Razor would suggest that we maintain a healthy skepticism toward his theory, 
on account of its complexity. Although many of its components are well-supported by 
experimental data, Tomasello's account of language development and human linguistic 
uniqueness is far from the simplest theory available.  
 At the same time, it is important to recognize that although Tomasello provides 
experimental evidence for many of his claims, there are some cognitive abilities on the 
list above for which he has not (to my knowledge) published experimental evidence. For 
example, the first item mentioned, the capacity of the child to understand that he or she is 
a producer of actions, does not appear to be supported by any experiment cited by 
Tomasello, although it must logically be a developmental prerequisite of item ii, the 
infant's understanding that his or her own actions are a result of his or her own intentions. 
That is, an infant surely cannot understand that he or she has intentions which cause the 
actions he or she produces to occur without first understanding that out of the set of all 
actions he or she perceives, a subset are produced by the self. Yet this first step is 
unacknowledged by Tomasello, and has not (to my knowledge) been explicitly tested for 
in human infants. Such gaps in Tomasello's experimental data do exist, although they are 
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not numerous; in general, Tomasello has endeavored to prove by means of experimental 
support that each ability in his account is present in human infants and that at least some 
of those capacities are absent in other apes. 
 Nevertheless, even if it were shown experimentally that, by the beginning of 
language-learning, human infants possess every cognitive and interpersonal ability 
required in Tomasello's account of language development, his theory linking those 
abilities to language-learning would remain unproven. For, crucially, that theory posits 
that a being's ability to perform all of the specific items listed above is a necessary 
condition for his or her ability to acquire a language: human infants can only develop 
language because they have the abilities i through xxvii above, and nonhuman apes do not 
develop language because, lacking some of those abilities, they cannot do so. Tomasello 
claims that a being's possession of the full list of features is "of particular importance for 
language acquisition… These skills are necessary for children to acquire the appropriate 
use of any and all linguistic symbols, including complex linguistic expressions and 
constructions… [or] are necessary for children to find patterns in the way adults use 
linguistic symbols across different utterances, and so to construct the grammatical 
(abstract) dimensions of human linguistic competence" (Tomasello 2003: 3-4, emphasis 
added). These claims of necessity, however, are unsupported in his data. 
 Instead, what Tomasello has found evidence for is a correlation between the listed 
items and the development of language, in that the human infants he has studied have 
been experimentally shown to possess each ability on the list3 and have presumably also 
acquired a language. His findings regarding the linguistic uniqueness of humans are 
similarly correlative in nature, as he claims that the apes he has studied have possessed 
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neither the totality of cognitive and interpersonal abilities in his account nor the 
development of a human-like language. These findings regarding both apes and humans 
would support the assertion that there is a correlation between the abilities listed above 
and the development of language, yet Tomasello proposes that the relationship is one of 
necessity. 
 It is a weakness of Tomasello's theory, and a reason to be skeptical as to his 
conclusions, that this necessity itself cannot be tested. That is, it would be impossible – 
not to mention highly unethical – to experimentally remove one of the abilities in 
Tomasello's account from a human infant, such as his or her understanding that actions 
can be relevant to a joint attentional frame (item xi above), to test whether the child 
would fail to develop language as Tomasello's theory would predict. Nor could a 
researcher somehow engender all of the listed traits in a nonhuman creature, to test 
whether the creature could then learn a language. Yet without tests of this nature, there is 
no conclusive proof that the items in Tomasello's account (though correlative) are 
actually required for the development of language. Unlike the correlation, a necessary 
relationship between those abilities and language development cannot be independently 
tested and thereby experimentally proven. 
 Moreover, even with the evidence for strong correlation, it is plausible to imagine 
Tomasello's account could include one or more items which in fact do not affect language 
development. For example, by virtue of the fact that humans live on earth and that human 
infants develop language, there is a clear correlation between living on earth and 
acquiring a language, and yet presumably there exists no necessary link between these 
items; it would be incorrect to assert that humans have language because we live on earth 
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and that no individuals living off of earth (even human infants raised on the moon) could 
develop language. Although Tomasello has provided compelling reasons for believing 
that the items he lists could help a language learner, he cannot show experimentally that 
the child needs to have those abilities in order to acquire language, and that means that 
the correlation may be misleading. The ultimate weakness of Tomasello's account is that 
despite its attractiveness as an explanatory theory, the explanation he provides cannot be 
tested empirically. (Although it is important to note that this weakness is also found in 
Chomskyan theories, which in addition cannot even be tested for a correlation between 
language development and a scientifically unverifiable single language-specific 
endowment. Therefore, this weakness of unproven causality may be more indicative of 
the field of language acquisition studies itself than of Tomasello's approach in particular.) 
For all of the experimental data that Tomasello has collected on language development in 
human infants, his theory as to the necessary prerequisites of language development 
remains conjectural. 
 In general, the experiments Tomasello has conducted support the notion that 
unlike humans, chimpanzees are not naturally motivated to act helpfully, assume 
helpfulness in others, form joint goals, or construct and conform to group expectations. 
Insofar as the unverifiable logic of Tomasello's account of language development can be 
accepted, these inabilities may represent at least part of the reason why chimpanzees do 
not acquire language as human infants do. While the puzzle of human linguistic 
uniqueness remains an open question, Michael Tomasello's cross-species research on the 
cognitive and interpersonal abilities of apes and humans has helped to lay out in detail the 
many complexities of the issue. 
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7 – Notes 
                                                
1
  Tomasello's research involving nonhuman subjects has focused primarily on 
individuals of the species Pan troglodytes, the common chimpanzee, although he has 
conducted research on dogs and goats as well. 
2
  According to Tomasello, these expectations are often due to the joint attentional 
scene between speaker and learner being an activity "recurrent in their daily experience, 
such as bathing, feeding, diaper changing, book reading, and traveling in the car… [in 
which] the child understands her own and the adult's goal's in the situation, which enables 
her to infer the relevance of the adult's language to those goals" (Tomasello 1999: 110). 
3
  Although to my knowledge it is true that Tomasello has never tested for each 
ability in his account in the same group of infants, it seems reasonable enough to assume 
that multiple human infants have similar cognitive capacities, such that if one group of 
infants is proven to be able to do X and another group is proven to be able to do Y, the 
conclusion that infants can do X and Y is sound.
